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OPINION OF THE COURT 
4 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In February 1993, the Golden Venture, a ship bearing 
human cargo of approximately 300 Chinese nationals, left the 
waters of Thailand bound for the distant shores of the United 
States.  The petitioner Yong Zhong Pan (Pan), one of its 
passengers, together with hundreds of other Chinese nationals, 
had made a dangerous journey from the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) across the mountains and borders of Burma into Thailand. 
There, they embarked aboard the Golden Venture, which attempted 
unlawfully to smuggle them into the United States.  After more 
than one hundred days at sea, the ship, within sight of its final 
destination, ran aground off the New York harbor.  Its passengers 
were thrown or jumped into the sea, but most of them managed to 
survive and safely reach shore.  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) took these aliens into custody, 
detained them, and commenced exclusion proceedings against them. 
 Approximately one hundred twenty of the Golden Venture 
passengers, including Pan, were transferred to the York County 
Prison on June 7, 1993.  The York County Prison is located in the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania where many of the detainees, 
including Pan, filed claims for asylum which were rejected. After 
exhausting their administrative remedies, they individually filed 
habeas corpus actions in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania challenging the final orders of 
exclusion.  Because the petitioners raised many similar issues 
and filed many similar motions for relief, the district court 
5 
consolidated the individual actions under the above-entitled 
caption. 
 On November 17, 1993, Pan filed an amended petition and 
a separate complaint seeking nationwide class certification and 
interim class relief.  Pending a determination of the court's 
jurisdiction, it initially granted conditional class 
certification limited to those aliens in the Middle District who 
had exhausted their administrative remedies.  Contemporaneously, 
the court issued a temporary restraining order barring the 
Government from deporting any class members before December 1993, 
which date it later extended.  The court subsequently declined on 
jurisdictional grounds to certify the requested nationwide class; 
it decertified the conditionally certified class and accordingly 
lifted the temporary restraining order as moot.  Pan timely 
appealed to this court.  We affirm. 
I. 
 In his application for asylum, Pan claimed that he was 
persecuted and has a well-founded fear of future persecution by 
the Chinese government, if denied asylum, because of his 
opposition to its birth control policies.  Specifically, Pan 
averred that after the birth of their first child, he and his 
wife fled to avoid sterilization.  While in hiding, Mrs. Pan bore 
a second son.  At the hospital where the child was born, she was 
forced to undergo sterilization.  The Pans were also ordered to 
pay heavy fines.  Because the Pans were unable to pay the full 
amount, officials came to their home, confiscated some furniture 
and demolished parts of the house.  Fearing arrest, exorbitant 
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fines, and harsh physical punishment, Pan decided to leave his 
homeland and family to come to the United States. 
 On August 9, 1993, an Immigration Judge (IJ) heard and 
rejected Pan's asylum claim.  Pan appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) which found that Pan's testimony lacked 
plausibility, accuracy, and truthfulness in light of the evidence 
of record regarding general conditions in China.  The Board 
therefore held that Pan failed to meet his burden of establishing 
his eligibility for asylum.  Furthermore, the Board reaffirmed 
its adherence to Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. No. 3107 (BIA 1989). 
In Matter of Chang, the BIA determined that the People's Republic 
of China's one couple, one child policy was not, on its face, 
persecutive within the meaning of the relevant asylum statutes 
and regulations. 
 In his amended petition/complaint seeking certification 
of a nationwide class of Chinese aliens, Pan broadly defined the 
class to include:   
All persons who, as nationals of the PRC, are 
or in the future may be applicants for 
withholding of deportation from and/or for 
asylum in the United States, in whole or in 
part because they have a clear probability 
(for withholding of deportation) or well 
founded fear (for asylum) of persecution on 
account of coerced population control 
policies of the PRC. 
The class complaint essentially challenged the BIA's reliance and 
application of its decision in Chang.  In addition, Pan sought a 
preliminary injunction forbidding the INS from deporting any 
member of the nationwide class. 
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 In rejecting a nationwide class certification, the 
court reasoned that the nationwide scope of the requested class 
was inconsistent with the statutory limitations for judicial 
review.  Specifically, the court noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) 
requires that judicial review of an exclusion order may be 
obtained only "by habeas corpus proceedings and not otherwise" 
and that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) mandates that for an order of 
exclusion to be reviewed by a court, aliens must exhaust all 
administrative remedies available to them.  Thus, because the 
proposed nationwide class would include those aliens who are not 
within the court's habeas jurisdiction and who have not satisfied 
the exhaustion requirement, the court concluded that its 
jurisdiction would not extend to them.  On the appeal before us 
now, the issues raised are whether the district court erred in 
denying Pan's motion for nationwide class certification and 
injunctive relief. 
II.  
 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the 
district court's denial of Pan's motion for a preliminary 
injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  Because the 
district court's ruling denying class certification is 
inextricably bound up in our review of the denial of the 
injunction, we have jurisdiction to address that determination 
too.  Cohen v. Board of Trustees, 867 F.2d 1455, 1468 (3d Cir. 
1989) (in banc). 
 On appeal, Pan disputes the district court's 
determination that it lacked jurisdiction to certify a nationwide 
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class of Chinese aliens.  He invokes 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (immigration 
matters), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and 5 
U.S.C. § 701-06 et seq (Administrative Procedure Act) as 
authority on which the district court could have based subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Our review of the district court's 
determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction is plenary. 
See Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 601 (3d Cir 1991). 
 We begin, as the district court did, with a review of 
the specific jurisdictional limitations applicable to alien 
exclusion proceedings.  Chief Judge Rambo of the district court 
noted that, although Congress has provided judicial review of 
agency determinations of excludability in the context of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., 
it also imposed specific limitations on the timing and scope of 
such a review.  First, an alien subject to a final order of 
exclusion may seek review of the determination only in a habeas 
corpus proceeding.  8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) ("[A]ny alien against 
whom a final order of exclusion has been made . . . may obtain 
judicial review of such order by habeas corpus proceeding and not 
otherwise.").  A district court's habeas corpus jurisdiction is 
territorially limited and extends only to persons detained and 
custodial officials acting within the boundaries of that 
district.  28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be 
granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their 
respective jurisdictions.") (emphasis supplied); see also Braden 
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493-95 (1973) 
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(holding that habeas jurisdiction proper where court issuing writ 
has jurisdiction over custodian).   
 Second, courts are empowered to review orders of 
exclusion only for those individuals who have exhausted their 
administrative remedies.  8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) ("An order of 
deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if 
the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available 
to him as of right under the immigration laws or regulations. . . 
.").  Thus, aliens who have received an adverse decision from an 
immigration judge must first exercise their right to take an 
administrative appeal to the BIA.  Only after the BIA affirms the 
IJ's decision would an alien be entitled to judicial review.  See 
Alleyne v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, 
879 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1989) (§ 1105a(c) precludes judicial 
review when there is no appeal to the Board).   
 Read together, these two statutory provisions would bar 
the district court from certifying appellant's class insofar as 
the proposed class would include Chinese aliens, or their 
custodians, not within the Middle District of Pennsylvania and 
Chinese aliens who have not yet received a final BIA decision.  
Accordingly, the district court concluded correctly that since 
the proposed class included individuals over whom it had no 
jurisdiction, the class could not be certified.  See Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979) (explaining that class may 
only be certified where court has jurisdiction over the claim of 
each individual member of the class). 
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 Notwithstanding these provisions limiting jurisdiction, 
Pan contends that the general jurisdictional provision of 8 
U.S.C. § 1329 is applicable to this action.  The language of 
§1329 is broad.  The statute states that "[t]he district courts 
of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil 
and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of the [INA]." 
It is substantially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which confers 
jurisdiction on district courts over "all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
Pan's argument, although superficially appealing, does not 
withstand scrutiny. 
 Pan cannot simply ignore statutory provisions that are 
averse to his position.1  The statute must be construed so as to 
give effect to each provision.  See United States v. Alcan 
                                                           
1Congress did not haphazardly restrict an alien in exclusion 
proceedings to the writ of habeas corpus for judicial review. 
Congress was disturbed with the growing frequency of judicial 
actions initiated by aliens where cases had no legal basis or 
merit, but which were brought solely to prevent or delay 
indefinitely their deportation.  It carefully concluded that 
habeas corpus not only gave the alien the privilege of testing 
the legality of the proceedings, but also an opportunity for a 
fair hearing.  "Such a restriction to habeas corpus does not 
deprive the alien of any constitutional rights.  It is well 
settled that aliens seeking admission to the United States cannot 
demand that their applications for entry be determined in a 
particular manner or by use of a particular type of proceedings." 
H.R. Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2976. 
 
The Committee on the Judiciary attached "special significance . . 
. that habeas corpus actions are necessarily determined in the 
locality where the alien is, where he has been excluded, and 
where he 'knocking at the door.'  This prevents a process of 
'shopping around' by an applicant for admission for a court in 
which he may seek to file repetitive declaratory judgment 
actions."  Id. at 2977. 
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Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 1992).  To hold 
otherwise would render the jurisdiction and exhaustion provisions 
of §§ 1105a(b) and (c) superfluous.  Id.  Interpreting the 
statute in a manner that harmonizes all its provisions, we hold 
that, in enacting §§ 1105a(b) and (c), Congress permitted 
judicial challenges of orders of exclusion solely by way of 
habeas proceedings and only to those aliens who have exhausted 
their administrative remedies. 
 Pan, citing to a number of a cases, persists in 
arguing, however, that where, as here, his claims not only 
challenge excludability but also raise a challenge to the 
Government's programmatic application of Chang as an arbitrary 
barrier to asylum claims grounded in the "one child" policy, 
jurisdiction should not be limited to a habeas proceeding, but 
rather should be deemed proper under § 1331.  The cases Pan 
relies upon for support are inapposite.   
 In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 
(1991), the Supreme Court upheld district court jurisdiction 
under § 1331 in the face of another provision of the INA similar  
to § 1105a(b).  The provision in question barred judicial review 
of an administrative decision denying legal status to special 
agricultural workers (SAW), except when reviewing an order of 
exclusion or deportation.  Id. at 486.  The court found that the 
provision did not preclude it from exercising jurisdiction over a 
class action complaint alleging various procedural abuses, which 
effectively precluded an alien from making an adequate record for 
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appeal.  Id. at 487-89.  The Court's holding was influenced by a 
number of factors.    
 First, the Court stated that the provision limiting 
review except in the context of an order of deportation or 
exclusion was narrowly drawn.  It referred to "a determination" 
which connotes a single act.  Because the plaintiffs were 
challenging a practice or procedure rather than a denial based on 
the factual merits of an individual application, the statutory 
provision limiting review was not applicable to them.  The Court 
reasoned that, had Congress intended the review provisions to 
apply to INS procedures and practices, it could have easily 
drafted broader exclusionary language. 
      Moreover, the Court held that because the relief that 
the aliens were seeking was procedural and collateral to the 
merits of the denial of legal status for SAW, the aliens were not 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies.  Furthermore, 
the Court was reluctant to limit judicial review because to do 
so, would, as a practical procedural matter, have amounted to a 
complete denial of meaningful judicial review.  This was the case 
because, under the INA, review was limited to the administrative 
record which the aliens alleged was incomplete and inadequate. 
These factors, however, are not applicable here. 
 To begin with, the provision limiting review to habeas 
corpus is broad enough to encompass aliens with appellant Pan's 
status.  Section 1105a(b) clearly states that "any alien against 
whom a final order of exclusion has been made . . .  may obtain 
judicial review of such order by habeas corpus and not 
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otherwise." (emphasis added).  Thus, because Pan is subject to an 
order of exclusion, he should not be able to circumvent the 
explicit language of the statute and the intent of Congress.   
 Moreover, Pan's claim that the BIA is impermissibly 
applying Chang is neither procedural nor collateral.  It is, at 
bottom, a substantive challenge to the legal standard employed by 
the Government in adjudicating asylum claims.  To describe this 
challenge as procedural because appellant is not challenging his 
order of exclusion but rather the legal standard upon which his 
order was based, is not persuasive.  If appellant's 
characterization is correct, the review provisions of an order of 
exclusion or deportation could simply be elided by characterizing 
the challenge as a collateral attack on the legal standard rather 
than a direct assault on the order.  This result is indefensible. 
 Our reasoning is bolstered by the Supreme Court's 
construction of "final orders of deportation."  In INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1983), the Court held that the term includes "all 
matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent." 
Id. at 938.  This point applies with equal force in the context 
of orders of exclusion.  Here, the BIA's decision in Chang is, 
according to Pan, the predicate for the order of exclusion being 
entered against him.  In reality, Pan, therefore, challenges the 
final order and squarely falls within § 1105a(b). 
 Finally, a denial of the class certification would not 
foreclose all forms of meaningful judicial review.  Regardless of 
whether a class is certified, the district court would have the 
authority and opportunity to review the validity of Chang to 
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determine whether the INA extends asylum to aliens who flee their 
country to avoid persecution on account of their opposition to 
their country's policy of coercive population control.  In fact, 
in an individual habeas corpus action commenced by another alien 
who arrived on the Golden Venture, the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in concluding that 
the alien was eligible for asylum, held that Chang is not 
controlling and that the BIA's interpretation of the Act merits 
no judicial deference.  Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858 
(E.D. Va. 1994).  This decision fortifies our position that 
restricting review to a habeas corpus proceeding does not deny 
appellant effective review of his claim.  Thus, the case sub 
judice is distinguishable in significant respects from McNary.  
 Although we realize that Chinese aliens who do not file 
habeas petitions will be unable to obtain judicial review of 
their claims -- and it is for this reason that Pan seeks a 
nationwide class of all Chinese aliens, including those who have 
not filed habeas petitions -- we are, nevertheless, restrained 
from acting.  By limiting review to those aliens who have filed 
habeas petitions, Congress intended to foreclose all other 
avenues of relief and it obviously realized that some aliens may 
not have their day in court.  Although Pan suggests that this is 
a harsh result, the scheme enacted by Congress strikes a careful 
balance, ensuring judicial review for those aliens who seek it, 
while sheltering the judicial system from being overpowered with 
frivolous claims of asylum.     
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 As further support for his position that declaratory 
relief is appropriate, Pan cites Brownell v. We Shung, 352 U.S. 
180 (1956), where the Supreme court recognized the existence of 
jurisdiction in the district courts to entertain either habeas 
corpus actions or actions for declaratory and injunctive relief, 
in the context of exclusion proceedings.  Shung's precedential 
value, however, is suspect inasmuch as it was decided before the 
enactment of § 1105a(b).  Although at least one case decided 
after the enactment of § 1105a(b) has cited Shung with approval, 
Pizarro v. District Director Of U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 415 F.2d 481 n.1 (9th Cir. 1969), we 
believe that Congress intended to supersede Shung.  See Garcia v. 
Smith, 674 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1982), modified on other grounds, 
680 F.2d 1327 (11th Cir. 1982); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 
1503 (11th Cir. 1983), on reh'g, en banc, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 
1984), and aff'd,  472 U.S. 846 (1985); see also H.R. Rep. No. 
1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 
2974 (§ 1105a restores law to the position it occupied prior to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Shung). 
 In any event, Shung is inapposite.  The relevant 
statute in Shung required aliens who hold "certificates of 
identity" to test the validity of their exclusion by habeas 
corpus only.  Shung, 352 U.S. at 183.  The alien in question did 
not possess the certificate and therefore did not fall within the 
purview of the statute.  Id.  Not wanting to conclude that Shung 
would be deprived of judicial review, the Court determined that 
he could proceed via a declaratory action.  Id.  In the case sub 
16 
judice, however, Pan falls squarely within the statute requiring 
him to file a habeas petition.  Moreover, by filing a habeas 
petition, Pan will obtain judicial review.  Thus, the holding in 
Shung does not implicate our present situation.  Rather, it 
addresses the same concerns identified by the Court in McNary, 
and can be distinguished in the same manner.    
 Nor would any of the other cases cited by Pan provide 
the court with authority to ignore the explicit requirements of 
§1105a in favor of a general grant of authority under § 1331. 
Courts invoking § 1331 jurisdiction have done so only when the 
challenged administrative practice, policy or regulation 
precluded adequate development of the administrative record and 
consequently meaningful review through the procedures set forth 
in § 1105a, and/or when the challenged practice was collateral 
and divorced from the substantive aspects underlying the alien's 
claim of asylum.  In this sense, the holdings are similar to 
McNary, and thus would be inapplicable in circumstances, as those 
present here, where judicial review is adequate and where the 
challenge relates to the merits of the final order.  See, e.g., 
El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration 
Review, 959 F.2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (§ 1331 jurisdiction 
proper in class challenge alleging systematic inadequate 
translation of immigration proceedings by INS); Montes v. 
Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 1331 
jurisdiction proper in class challenge to action of individual 
Immigration Judge who refused to accept certain documents); Jean 
v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 979-80 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (§ 
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1331 jurisdiction proper in class challenge to INS failure to 
give notice of right to apply for asylum), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 
(1985) (expressing no view on jurisdictional issues); Haitian 
Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. 1982) (§ 
1331 jurisdiction proper in class challenge to expedited 
administrative procedure employed by the INS), disapproved on 
other grounds, Jean, 727 F.2d at 976 n.27. 
 It is noteworthy that Smith, the case expansively cited 
as authority by other courts and whose holding that § 1331 
jurisdiction is proper in spite of the limitations contained in 
§1105a, emphasized the narrowness of its holding and refused to 
condone "any such end-run around the administrative process." 
Smith, 676 F.2d at 1033.  Heeding Smith's admonition, we deny 
jurisdiction where, as here, the challenge by the aliens is 
neither procedural nor collateral to the merits and where 
application of the specific statutory provisions would not 
preclude meaningful judicial review.2   
   Nor would the APA, which provides for judicial review 
of "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," 5 
U.S.C. § 704, supply the district court with jurisdiction to 
certify a class claim. Pan does not deny that habeas review of 
the BIA's decision would be sufficient; rather he claims that 
aliens are entitled to due administrative, i.e., BIA, 
                                                           
2 We find it significant, as did the district court, that no 
court ever approved the exercise of § 1331 jurisdiction over the 
claims of an alien subject to a final order of exclusion. 
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consideration in the first instance.  The cited provision, 
however, provides no authority to allow courts to fashion 
alternatives to the scheme specified by Congress when the review 
procedure is adequate.  Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New 
Orleans and Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 420 (1965).  Thus, the 
district court did not err in denying class certification of 
Pan's proposed class and requiring members of the proposed class 
to follow the procedures set forth in § 1105a.     
 Pan's assertion that a class action would promote 
judicial economy consistent with Congress' goal of eliminating 
piecemeal proceedings does not convince us otherwise.  Even 
assuming, arguendo, that there are tangible efficiency gains in 
this case, in the long run, extending a district court's 
jurisdiction may well prove harmful to Congress' aim.  Granting 
an additional layer of judicial review will, in the end, 
frustrate the policy of curtailing repetitious and unjustified 
appeals.  If Congress is convinced that the procedures can be 
improved upon, then it and only it should provide for an 
alternative framework.  Our duty, however, is to apply faithfully 
the procedural requirements put in place by the legislature. 
 Although there is some authority that would allow 
class-wide habeas relief, Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 
1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975), the district court declined to 
certify a habeas class.  The court, seeing no advantage to a 
class-wide habeas action subject to exhaustion and jurisdictional 
limits, instead consolidated all similar claims within its 
district.  We do not believe the court in the instant case abused 
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its discretion in refusing to certify this class, even though the 
court, for some reason, had decided provisionally to certify a 
habeas class.   
  Pan contends, however, that contrary to the district 
court's assertion it did not have to limit its habeas territorial 
jurisdiction to aliens held in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  He reasons that because a writ of habeas acts upon 
the custodian of the detainee, the writ should issue to the 
district director of the INS, over whom the court did have 
personal jurisdiction, and thus detainees under the constructive 
custody of the district director, even those not within the 
court's district, should be subject to the court's habeas 
jurisdiction.  This argument has no merit.   
 It is the warden of the prison or the facility where 
the detainee is held that is considered the custodian for 
purposes of a habeas action.  See Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 
306 (1944) (writ is directed to prisoner's "jailer").  This is 
because it is the warden that has day-to-day control over the 
prisoner and who can produce the actual body.  See Brittingham v. 
United States, 982 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992); Guerra v. Meese, 786 
F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Parole Commission is not custodian 
despite its power to release the petitioner).  That the district 
director has the power to release the detainees does not alter 
our conclusion.  Otherwise, the Attorney General of the United 
States could be considered the custodian of every alien and 
prisoner in custody because ultimately she controls the district 
directors and the prisons.  Thus, the district court correctly 
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held that its habeas jurisdiction is limited to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania.   
 Pan also suggests, without providing any support, that 
we direct the district court to certify a class-wide habeas 
action by first certifying a defendant class consisting of 
various district directors around the country who are responsible 
for the custody of Chinese aliens.  Once a defendant class is 
certified, Pan claims that a nationwide plaintiff class can 
properly be certified.  Pan's contention is circuitous and 
illogical and we reject it.  If, as discussed above, a nationwide 
plaintiff class can not be certified on its own merits, due to 
the court's territorial limitations, we fail to see how the 
certification of a defendant class would make any difference.  In 
any event, as previously discussed the district directors are not 
the proper parties upon whom writs of habeas corpus should be 
served.     
 Finally, because Pan's motion for injunctive relief is 
premised on the granting of class certification which we deny, we 
deny this relief too.  
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
affirmed.    
